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Enhancing the Capability of Central Finance Agencies 
Richard Allen and Francesco Grigoli
CFAs are not a single organization or entity of government, but 
a group of ministries and agencies1 of which the ministry of fi-
nance (MoF) is usually the most prominent, with collective re-
sponsibility for the design and execution of a country’s wide 
array of financial and fiscal functions.2 In this note, the term 
“CFA” is used as shorthand for ministries and agencies that play 
a significant role in undertaking such functions. These func-
tions can be divided for convenience into the 16 categories 
shown in table 1.
The allocation of roles and responsibilities for central fi-
nance functions among government agencies varies substan-
tially from country to country and results in higher or lower 
degrees of fragmentation. There is no “best practice” model.3 In 
some countries, the MoF employs more than 100,000 staff, in 
others, less than 100. Such huge variations are not only related 
to easily quantifiable factors such as population size and the 
size of the public sector, but also to a range of informal and non-
technical factors—described in the present study as political 
economy factors.
This note addresses the important but little discussed issue 
of how the organization and management of CFAs could evolve 
A well-organized and effective finance ministry and its associated central finance agencies (CFAs) are essential to good fiscal 
outcomes. Recent studies of CFAs in selected low-income countries demonstrate that their organizational structure varies 
widely and that decision making on public finance is strongly influenced by political economy factors. This note presents 
some common themes arising from the case studies and provides some descriptive evidence about the organizational structure 
of the CFAs. This note also includes evidence of a “U-curve” pattern in the development of the organizational structure of 
CFAs over the long term. It confirms that political economy analysis, though difficult to apply in practice, is highly relevant 
in the development of reform strategies for strengthening CFAs and public financial management systems. 
Table 1. Central Finance Functions
Macroeconomic forecasting, analysis, and fiscal policy
Tax policy
Budget preparation and analysis
Public investment management
Aid and debt management
Financial assets and liabilities
Intergovernmental fiscal relations






Financial framework for managing state-owned enterprises
Tax revenues and customs administration
Public financial management reform coordination
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in light of political economy considerations.4 Starting with the 
work of  Dressel and Brumby (2009), which sets out a political 
economy framework for analyzing CFAs, this note highlights 
some common themes and features that were elaborated in a 
set of case studies of 10 low-income countries (LICs).5 In addi-
tion, the note presents some descriptive findings based on a da-
tabase of CFAs in 55 countries at various stages of develop-
ment, and concludes with a presentation of the case studies’ 
policy implications. 
Methodological Framework
The framework summarized in figure 1 defines five key inter-
faces for CFAs—with formal political institutions, administra-
tive institutions, civil society, external actors, and within the 
CFAs themselves.
The framework makes an important distinction between 
the capacity and capability of CFAs. “Capacity” refers to the 
volume or scope of inputs such as human resources or ICT sys-
tems. “Capability” focuses on how such volumes can be con-
verted into better performance through mechanisms such as 
clarifying roles and responsibilities in performing CFA func-
tions; strengthening arrangements for coordination and infor-
mation sharing within and across CFAs; clarifying relations 
with line ministries, civil society groups, development part-
ners, and other stakeholders; improving the management of 
internal business processes such as decision-making hierar-
chies, corporate planning, and information systems; and 
strengthening the management of human resources and inter-
nal incentives. 
In practice, many countries have focused attention on 
strengthening capacity, with less emphasis on strengthening 
capability. The two concepts are typically linked: where capac-
ity is low, capability is also likely to be limited.  However, this 
relationship does not hold in all cases: a weak configuration 
and/or organization of inputs and a high-cost operating envi-
ronment, perhaps also marked by institutional constraints 
such as a finance minister who lacks a power base within the 
government, may mean that even when capacity is high, capa-
bility may be low. In other countries, the reverse situation of 
low capacity and high capability may arise: finance functions 
are well organized and professionally staffed and business pro-
cesses are efficient, but outcomes are constrained by limited 
inputs.  
It can be argued that conventional instruments for analyz-
ing public financial management (PFM) systems—notably the 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) As-
sessment Framework and much technical assistance work car-
ried out by the international financial institutions (IFIs)—have 
focused primarily on the formal, technical characteristics of 
these systems and have paid too little attention to analyzing the 
important political economy factors noted above. However, 
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Figure 1. The Political Economy Environment of CFAs
Source: Dressel and Brumby 2009 (figure 1).3  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK     www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
reforming PFM systems and CFAs fail to be implemented fully, 
and why de jure reforms based only on changes in formal legal 
systems tend to be more successful than de facto reforms based 
on actual changes in behavior, which lag behind (Andrews 
2010).   
The case studies conducted by the World Bank (2011) help 
to fill a gap in the literature on strategies for reforming PFM, 
namely insufficient analysis of the institutional and political 
economy foundations of such strategies. Such analysis is impor-
tant to ensure that initiatives to strengthen CFAs and PFM sys-
tems are politically tractable as well as being technically sound. 
Reforms should be compatible with the incentives of the na-
tional authorities and donors to ensure that reform implemen-
tation is not constrained and does not experience the setbacks 
that often occur in developing countries. 
Evidence from the Case Studies
World Bank (2011) includes case studies of 10 LICs, 6 of which 
were in the Africa region (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, 
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone), 2 in East Asia and the Pacific (Mon-
golia and Tonga), 1 in Latin America and the Caribbean (Nica-
ragua), and 1 in the Middle East and North Africa (the Repub-
lic of Yemen). This section summarizes some of the main 
lessons emerging from these studies.
First, in several of the countries studied, the head of state 
plays an unpredictable and sometimes capricious role in mak-
ing executive decisions on the budget and financial policy. 
While such powers are normally exercised within the frame-
work of the constitution and budget law, they are not always 
compatible with the idea of an efficient and transparent budget 
process, as described in the literature on public finance. An im-
portant implication of this analysis is that large tracts of the fis-
cal process are likely to be outside the direct influence of the fi-
nance minister and off limits from a reform perspective. 
Second, it was observed that, in some countries, the head of 
state uses his political authority to divide the financial power 
attributed to the minister of finance among several ministers. 
Such actions are often taken to avoid the accumulation of exces-
sive authority in the hands of one person, and to preserve the 
discretionary powers of the president over spending and reve-
nue collection. Another reason is that ministerial portfolios not 
only provide access to rents, but also accommodate factions 
within the ruling coalition. Such tactics of “divide and rule” are 
not unknown in developed countries,6 and seem to be quite 
commonplace in less-developed countries. In some LICs, espe-
cially early in the tenure of a new head of state, the reverse phe-
nomenon can be observed: the head chooses to use the finance 
minister as an ally in building the economic and financial power 
of the state, and gives the minister strong powers. Such an alli-
ance can also give a strong momentum to the reform process.
Third, several of the case studies involved functional and or-
ganizational reviews of the MoF and its relationship with other 
CFAs. The internal capability of an MoF was broken down into 
the following six dimensions: (i) organizational structure; (ii) at-
traction and retention of staff; (iii) performance management; 
(iv) decentralized decision making; (v) change management; 
and (vi) information technology. Issues of interest that emerged 
from the case studies include inadequate staff records, poor sys-
tems for recruiting and retaining staff, ineffective performance 
management, inefficient top management structures and over-
hierarchical decision-making processes, and ineffective use of 
information and communication technology (ICT) systems.   
Fourth, the case studies confirm the view that changing the 
organization of finance ministries and CFAs is a difficult pro-
cess that is likely to meet opposition from both politicians and 
staff. Moreover, there is an absence of international bench-
marks, guidelines, and standards indicating the desired organi-
zational structure or number of staff required to implement 
key finance functions. In advanced countries, these arrange-
ments vary widely from country to country depending on the 
legal and administrative traditions and practices.  
Fifth, the studies tend to confirm results of other work: 
weak coordination among donors—and between donors and 
their clients in finance and planning ministries—is a major 
problem in designing and implementing coherent strategies for 
reforming CFAs and PFM systems (Allen 2008; de Renzio 
2011). There is a tendency for donors to bundle together a large 
number of initiatives in a single PFM reform strategy or lending 
operation,7 without giving due attention to the government’s 
capability to implement the measures concerned; donors also 
tend to be too optimistic about how long it will take to imple-
ment reforms. In reality, it is the marginal improvements in 
PFM that are important rather than the overall plan, which is 
often too elaborate and overengineered. Moreover, securing 
large loans from donors may improve the recipient country’s 
status regionally and internationally, as well as providing a valu-
able new source of economic rents. 
Finally, the study confirms evidence set out in other stud-
ies—for example, de Renzio (2011) and Allen (2008)—namely 
that reforms of CFAs and PFM in many LICs are strongly influ-
enced by donor requirements, with insufficient government 
“ownership.” Moreover, experts from advanced countries, 
hired to advise on the technical aspects of PFM reforms, may 
recommend finance ministers to proceed with reforms that are 
insufficiently related to local needs and capabilities.8  
Analysis of the Organizational Structure  
of CFAs
In addition to the case studies described above, data on a wider 
sample of countries were collected on the allocation of central 
finance functions and related activities among the MoF and 
other CFAs, as well as on staffing issues and ICT usage.9
A core objective of the empirical analysis is to consider the 
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accounts within a treasury single account are other examples 
of this centralization trend. This trend has both a technologi-
cal aspect (to increase overall fiscal control) and political as-
pects requiring greater accountability and transparency: the 
emergence of a professional middle class holding the govern-
ment accountable for fiscal performance; a less dominant role 
for rent seeking in driving budget allocations; the rise in power 
of the finance ministry as an institution of government; the 
increased political importance of the annual budget; and in-
creasing reliance on international capital markets as a source 
of finance. 
In high-middle-income and advanced countries, finance 
ministers are unlikely to relax their grip on central controls of 
the budget process unless political conditions require them to 
do so. However, even in the budget area, the role of the finance 
ministry may change from directly operating the systems con-
cerned to an oversight and monitoring function, while direct 
operations are transferred to line ministries and/or subordinate 
agencies responsible for treasury and procurement functions. 
In many operational areas, finance ministers may delegate op-
erational responsibility for the activities concerned to subordi-
nate agencies under their supervision. Fragmentation may 
therefore increase again, as the “managerial” culture and decen-
tralization spread, new agencies are created, and further com-
puterization takes place.
This historical perspective of fragmentation has important 
policy implications.11 LICs should be encouraged to centralize 
their finance functions and be cautious about enacting poli-
cies—for example, fiscal decentralization—that do the reverse. 
Middle-income countries should be encouraged to gradually 
devolve authority for financial decision making to the agencies 
responsible for specific functions and programs, but without 
creating undue stress on their financial systems. For example, 
too rapid growth of autonomous government agencies has been 
a feature of developments in many middle-income countries, 
including in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but without ad-
equate safeguards and controls this growth can threaten the 
overall financial stability of these countries. Devolution should 
go hand-in-hand with the building of institutions and the de-
velopment of credible anticorruption policies.   
Some evidence in support of this interesting U-curve hy-
pothesis is provided in panel A of figure 3, where both the 
broad and the narrow index reflect the U-curve. As expected, 
panel B reveals that operational activities are in general more 
fragmented than policy activities across income groups. Panel B 
also shows that, while the fragmentation of operational activi-
ties follows the U-curve, the curve for policy activities is flatter. 
These tentative results need to be confirmed with more com-
prehensive data. 
Figure 4 indicates that the allocation of roles and responsi-
bilities for central finance activities among the finance ministry 
itself and other government agencies varies substantially from 
of one agency—usually the MoF—and to what extent they are 
distributed among other agencies of government. For this 
purpose, two measures of fragmentation were used: a narrow 
definition that measures the proportion of finance activities 
that are carried out by the central departments and units of 
the finance ministry and a broader definition that measures 
the proportion of activities carried out by the finance minis-
try and/or the subordinate agencies that report directly to it. 
The analysis also draws a distinction between policy activities 
(such as budget formulation and tax policy) and activities 
that are largely operational (such as tax collection and procure-
ment transactions).10 
It can be argued that, as countries move from the lowest in-
come group to the highest, the fragmentation of CFAs will ex-
hibit a U-shaped pattern such as that shown in figure 2.
At low-income levels, countries often have highly fragment-
ed CFAs in which control of public finances is divided accord-
ing to powerful political groups and, as discussed, by heads of 
state who deliberately fragment the authority of the finance 
minister to boost their own authority. Dispersed manual sys-
tems of accounting, reporting, and financial control tend to re-
inforce this phenomenon. 
As countries move to middle-income status, pressures to 
consolidate financial activities within the finance ministry in-
crease, often with the active encouragement of the IFIs. For 
example, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe went 
through this process in the 1990s after the breakdown of the 
former Soviet Union. Soviet-style central planning bureaus 
were dismantled, and central financial control systems rein-
forced. The goal of joining the European Union (EU) was a 
further incentive for these countries to centralize finance 
functions, because they had to comply with the strict financial 
conditions (on internal control, audit, and public procure-
ment) imposed by EU rules. Policies such as integrating the 
budget and planning processes, bringing extrabudgetary 
funds within the budget, and consolidating government bank 
Figure 2. CFA Fragmentation across Income Levels 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
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region to region.12 Of the six regions studied, the Middle East 
and North Africa and Europe and Central Asia show the high-
est levels of fragmentation, and South Asian countries the low-
est. It should be remembered that the small sample size is a 
limitation for such interregional comparisons.
Finally, one would expect the fragmentation of CFA activi-
ties to be higher in resource-rich countries than in non-re-
source-rich countries because resources constitute a poten-
tially huge additional source of fiscal revenues—and fiscal 
risk—that need to be managed, sometimes involving special 
instruments such as sovereign wealth funds. In the case of 
fragile states, the reverse is true. As discussed in a recent World 
Bank study (Fritz, Hedger, and Fialho Lopes 2011), there is 
often a unique opportunity in such countries to consolidate 
fiscal functions and activities within the finance ministry be-
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Figure 4. CFA Fragmentation across Regions
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thors and should not be attributed to the IMF, the World Bank, 
their Executive Boards, or their management.
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Endnotes
1. These typically include, in addition to the MoF, certain 
departments of the central bank and the ministry of economy; 
line ministries; subordinate agencies of the MoF with responsi-
bility for functions such as tax collection, customs administra-
tion, debt management, and public procurement; and organi-
zations that are external to the executive branch such as the 
legislature and the external audit authority.
2. In the so called “limited access order” countries, the role 
and responsibility of the finance ministry largely reflects the 
consensus of the political and business elite on how to use pub-
lic resources to help maintain the prevailing political order. In 
contrast, in “open access order” countries, the finance minis-
try’s role and responsibilities are largely defined by the goal of 
maximizing public resources for the public good.
3. Allen and Kohnert (forthcoming) provide a discussion on 
comparative CFA structures in a range of advanced countries, 
with special reference to France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom. 
4. The note is based on the findings of a study of CFAs in 
low-income countries that was financed jointly by the Bank-
Netherlands Partnership Program and the World Bank during 
2008–11. The full results of the study are included in a synthe-
sis report (World Bank 2011).  
5. World Bank (2011) describes these case studies in detail.
6. For example, countries such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
France, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, and the United States all 
have divided finance ministries. In most of these countries, po-
litical factors—notably an attempt to dilute the authority of the 
finance minister—played an important role in the decision to 
split these functions (Allen and Kohnert forthcoming).
7. The use of “basket funding,” in which donors pool their 
resources into a single fund and slice up the reform program 
of political groups, and because consolidation is usually in-
sisted upon by donors and welcomed—or at least acquiesced 
to—by the government as a requirement of donor support. 
Data analysis provides tentative support for these hypotheses 
(results not reported).
Policy Implications of the 10 CFA Case 
Studies  
The World Bank (2011) synthesis report shows that political 
economy analysis of CFAs is highly relevant—indeed essential—
to the design and implementation of new initiatives to strength-
en CFAs. An important implication of this finding is that po-
litical economy analysis is valuable in filtering out reform 
proposals for which political economy factors are favorable to 
success from those where there is a high risk of failure. One po-
tential method of analyzing such factors may be through case 
studies similar to those famously developed by the Harvard 
Business School for analyzing how companies resolve structur-
al, institutional, and human resource issues that constrain their 
growth and productivity.13 
Second, the case studies support work by Andrews (2010), 
de Renzio (2011), and others and demonstrates that “best 
fit,” “good enough governance” and second-best solutions, as 
opposed to best practice solutions, provide a better approach 
to reform and need to consider the institutional environment 
as well as technical conditions. A change in emphasis is re-
quired in cases where international finance institutions or 
bilateral donors are providing support for building stronger 
PFM systems in developing countries. Such a change in em-
phasis is the reverse of most current practice: technical solu-
tions would be proposed only after a detailed review of insti-
tutions has been carried out and solutions tailored to the 
specific political and institutional environment of the coun-
try concerned. Lending instruments could be developed 
(such as the Bank’s Performance for Results Framework) that 
facilitate such an approach. Reforms should only be proposed 
when they are compatible with existing institutions and in-
centives.14
Third, the data provide some support for the U-curve hy-
pothesis that historically CFAs may go through various stages of 
fragmentation in their evolution from low-income to high-in-
come status. The database provides useful information on the 
comparative fragmentation of CFAs across regions and coun-
tries, the number of staff working in central ministries of fi-
nance including a breakdown by skills and gender, and the use 
of ICT systems. If further developed, the database would pro-
vide a valuable research tool. 
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into pieces for which each of them take responsibility, may ex-
acerbate this tendency for reform programs to grow beyond the 
capability of either the donors or the client to implement them 
effectively.
8. A related issue is that countries may not have the human 
capacity to implement the reforms that are urged on them by 
the donor community. As a result, it is commonly observed 
that CFAs supplement their regular staff positions with consul-
tants and advisors financed by the donors. Such advisors often 
take responsibility for line management positions and once 
hired are difficult to move out. More important, they may per-
manently weaken the capability of the CFAs to build local ca-
pacity to fill the positions concerned. 
9. Of the 110 countries that were originally targeted, only 
55 countries responded to the survey, while responses to ques-
tions on staffing and ICT systems were 22 and 30, respectively.
10. More formally: 
Fragmentation Indexi=  
where A is an activity carried out uniquely by the MoF,  n is the 
total number of activities,  p is the number of activities that are 
not systematically carried out or do not exist, and  i is the sub-
script indentifying the index definition. Thus, a higher index 
value will reflect a more fragmented finance ministry. The 
broad fragmentation index is computed in the same way, but A 
now includes activities that are carried out primarily by a sub-
ordinate agency of the MoF, with or without the contribution 
of the MoF. Similar indices have been computed separately for 
policy and operational activities.
11. Because the advocated reform  approach is based on the 
notion of “best fit” solutions linked to specific country circum-
stances, these policy implications need to be interpreted broad-
ly and flexibly.
12. Andrews (2010) shows that countries that exhibit good 
outcomes can have very different governance structures, chal-
lenging the idea of one best-fit model for public financial man-
agement systems and government structures in general. 
13. For example, players representing different organiza-
tions—the finance ministry, line ministries, parliament, civil 
society, and others—could be brought together for the imple-
mentation of a specific policy initiative (for example, a new 
pension scheme or a proposal to reform local government fi-
nance) or a structural reform (such as establishing an inte-
grated revenue authority) to review how objections to such a 
reform, and constraints to implementation, can be resolved, 
and how incentives to facilitate implementation can be 
aligned.
14. Hasnain (2011) provides a useful example from Mongo-
lia, where the parliament exerts a powerful influence on public 
finances and is able to block important reforms if they do not 
meet the perceived needs of constituents. The paper argues 
that the parliament may be persuaded to support fiscally valu-
able reforms, for example, the development of an economically 
efficient system for allocating development grants, if their ac-
cess to constituency development funds—which has a low fiscal 
cost—is also preserved.
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